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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PROPERTY DAMAGES 
INGEBORG SCHWENZER* 
I. Introduction 
From the very beginning of products liability law, its aim has been to 
protect human life and limb. One may, for example, recall the development 
in the United States: from the so-called food casesl and MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co,2 to Henningsen v. Bloomfield3 and Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, 4 all involved a situation where the defect had caused personal 
injury. The prevention of personal injury still is the major issue in this field, 
as shown by the EEC Directive or by newly emerging problems of causation, 
as alternative or market share liability, or the discussion of the "state of the 
art" defence and so forth. 
But it is unanimously held that products liability law covers property 
damage as well as personal injury. In German law, this follows from the 
starting point of inanufacturer's liability: the basic provision of tort law5 
holds property as well a protected interest as life and limb. In American law, 
only a small step was necessary to equate property damage with personal 
injury by putting them both under the heading of physical injury.6 The EEC 
Directive7 holds the manufacturer liable for property damages only under 
* Professor of Law, University of Basel/ Switzerland. 
1. For acitation of cases, see Prosser, "The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer)," 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960) at 1106 et seq. 
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
3. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960). 
4. 59 Cal. 2d. 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 CaL Rptr. 697 (1962). 
5. BGB Section 823 par 1. 
6. For a citation of cases, see Prosser, "The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer),"50 Minn. L Rev. 791, 821 (1966). 
7. Art. 9 (b). 
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limited circumstances: only if the chattel damaged or destroyed is ordinarily 
intended for private use or consumption andin the specific case has been so 
used by the claimant. 
On the other hand most legal systems deny compensation for purely 
economic loss under tort principles. Although in the United States a few 
states follow the famous Santor decision8 and extend strict liability in tort to 
cover economic loss,9 most states follow the aforementioned rule. 10 New 
Jersey itself in the meantime has limited the Santor ruling as applicable to 
consumers only.11 
Thus in most legal systems the definition of property damage and the 
drawing of the line between property damage and economic loss becomes a 
crucial question in products liability law. The practical importance in this 
context lies in damages the ultimate user or consumer sustains. Property 
damages a mere bystander suffers - for example, his car is damaged in a 
collision with a defective car - do not pose greater pro blems, as principally 
this property is totally unrelated to the product. 
The issue to be discussed here is closely related to the general question of 
8. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). 
9. See, e.g., Cava v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W. 2d 800 
(1970); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439,330 A.2d 384, 17 UCC 
Rep. 39 (1974) (dictum); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 
(1966) (dictum); prior to Santor: Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,210 N.E.2d 
182, 2 UCC Rep. 762 (1965); and recently: Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 
653 S.W.2d 128 (Ark. 1983). 
10. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,403 P.2d 145 (1965); 
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelcamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981); Tri-State 
Jnsurance Company v. Lindsay Bros. Co., 364 N.W. 2d 894 (Minn. App. 1985); Valley 
Farmer's Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., 380 N.W. 2d 874 (Minn. App. 1986); Moorman 
Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 136, 47 Ill. Dec. 186,435 N.E. 
2d 443 (1982); Burnell v. Morning Star Hornes, Inc. 494 N.Y.S.2d 488 (App. Div. 1985); 
Schlavone Construction Co. v. Elgood Maya Corp. 436 N.E. 2d 1322 (N.Y. 1982); 
contra: N. Y. S. Ct. App.Div. 439 N. Y.S.2d 933 (App.Div. 1981); Sacramento Regional 
Transit Distr. v. Flexible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1984); Purvis v. 
Consolidated Energy Products Co., 67 4 F .2d 217 ( 4th Cir. 1982); American H ome Assur. 
Co. v. Major Tool & Machine, Inc., 767 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1985); McConnell v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D.N.J.1986); Sanco, Jnc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.Ind. 1984), affirmed 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985). 
11. Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555,489 A.2d 660 (1985); 
see Note, "Products Liability - Damages - Commercial Entity Limited to Breach of 
Warranty Theory for Recovery of Economic Losses - Spring Motors (ibid.), "17 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 330-354 (1897) at 344 et seq. 
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what kinds of interests should be protected by tort law and which ones are 
exclusively to be dealt with by contract law. 
In the following I shall focus on German and American law as well as the 
EEC Directive, although under the latter the problem is of less concern as 
liability for property damages of commercial buyers - in practice the most 
important issue - is not within the scope of the Directive. 
The most controversial cases I want to deal with, may be classified into 
four groups: 
II. Groups of Cases 
1. The first type is damage to the chattel itself. Can the buyer of a product 
claim damages in tort from the seller or the remote manufacturer if the 
product itself is damaged or destroyed by its defect? 
2. In the second group the question arises whether there is actionable 
property damage where property of the buyer necessarily and deliberately 
comes in close contact with the product, for instance, material tobe processed 
by a machine. 
3. The third group is closely related to the second one: it includes the case 
where a product is designed to protect property of the ultimate user but by 
not living up to these expectations, this very property is damaged or 
destroyed. 
4. At last, in the fourth group I want to pose the question of whether one 
might equate the actual threatening of personal injury or property damage 
with property damage already ensued and thus allow recovery for costs of 
repair and replacement of the defective product under products liability law, 
similar to some recent asbestos cases in the United States.12 
Before I turn to a discussion of these four groups of cases, however, I 
would like to recall the consequences that follow from a classification of 
these cases as either under contract law or under tort principles. 
12. Cf infra note 85; for details, see Brenza, "Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Loss 
Doctrine," 54 V.Chi. L.Rev. 277-311 (1987). 
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III. Consequences of Classification as Contractual or T ortious 
1. Persons Liable 
In the first place the classification of a loss as property damage recoverable 
under tort law is decisive in determining the group of persons to be held 
liable. This is true for German law, where co11-tractual liability generally 
depends on privity13 and probably in the majority of the American states, 
where the privity rule in implied warranty actions for economic loss is 
retained, 14 although a number of these states allow recpvery for economic 
loss under an express warranty without a direct contractual relationship. 15 
The EEC Directive only comes into play if the consumer suffered any 
property damage. 
2. Major Differences Between Contractual and Tortious Liability 
Defining a loss as property damage may be decisive in the relationship 
between a buyer and his immediate seller, or in determining the extent and 
details of the liability of a remote manufacturer if privity is not required. 
Limitations innate in contract law are all too often circumvented by tort law. 
a) Extent of Liability 
Anglo-American contract law,16 as well as the Hague and the Vienna 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,I7 restrict 
liability for secondary economic loss, i.e., primarily profits, by the so-called 
contemplation rule: that under the contract, the only lasses recoverable are 
those that must have been foreseen as a reasonable consequence of breach by 
the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract.I& In the Federal 
13. See the leading case BGH 26 Nov. 1968, BGHZ 51, 91 = JZ 1969, 387; annotated by 
Deutsch, ibid. 
14. See Cartwright & Phillips, Products Liability (1986), Section 2:26 at 204 with further 
quotations. 
15. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); Randy Knitwear, Inc. 
v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y. 2d5. 226N.Y.S.2d363, 181 N.E.2d 399(1962); Seely 
v. White Motor Co., supra note 10. 
16. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); UCC Section 2-715 (2) (a). 
17. ULIS Art. 82; CISG Art. 74. 
18. See supra note 16. 
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Republic some authors at least favor this rule in connection with the planned 
revision of parts of the BGß.19 
In tort law principally there does not exist any comparable limitation once 
property damage has been established. U nder German law it is not even 
necessary that the defendant foresee the consequential damages resulting 
from property damage.20 
b) Disclaimers and Limitations of Remedies 
The classification as property damage or purely economic loss is 
furthermore of great importance in respect to disclaimers and limitation of 
remedies clauses. 
Although West German courts pay lip service to the rule that liability in 
tort may be disclaimed,21 there is a strong tendency to disfavor such clauses 
once tortious liability has been established by applying the so-called "contra 
proferentem rule''22 and interpreting exculpatory clauses narrowly. Some 
German authors take a further step and hold unconscionable any clause that 
purports to exclude or limit liability in tort.23 
The same is true for American law. Whereas contractual liability may be 
disclaimed within the boundaries set forth by the uco,24 strict liability in 
tort generally cannot be disclaimed,25 although there are some decisions 
19. See V. Huber, in I Gutachten und Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, 
(1981) 674 at 729, 802 et seq. 
20. Cf Larenz, II Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, vol. II (1981) 12th ed.) Section 71 I; I (1987 
14th ed.) 27 III. 
21. See BGH 4 June 1975, BGHZ 64, 355; BGH 24 Nov. 1976, BGHZ 67, 359; see also 
Brandner, in Ulmer, Brandner & Hensen, AGBG (1986 5th ed.) Section 9 No. 115. 
22. AGBG Section 5; cf e.g., BGH 11 March 1986, NJW 1986, 2757; BGH 24 Nov. 1976, 
supra note 21, 
23. See V. Huber, "Zur Haftung des Verkäufers wegen positiver Vertragsverletzung," in AcP 
177 (1977), 281, 330 et seq.; idem in Soergel BGB (1986 11 th ed.), Vor Section 459 No. 
233; von Westphalen NJW 1979, 838 at 842 et seq; idem WM 1983, 976 at 980; contra: 
Manfred Wolf NJW 1980, 2433 at 2434; see also, Deutsch, I Haftungsrecht, (1976) 
Section 20 III.4 at 333. 
24. See UCC Section 2-316, 2-719; for details, see Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14 
Section 2.08 at 153 et seq. 
25. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,391 P.2d 168 (1964); 
see also Cartwright & Philips, supra note 13, Section 2.12 at 161; Section 402A 
Restatement of Torts (Second), comment m. 
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upholding an exculpatory clause bargained for between commercial entities 
of equal bargaining power.26 
The EEC Directive, too, explicitly denies any possibility of disclaiming 
liability within its field of application. 27 
c) N otice of Breach 
Sales law usually requires a buyer, in German law at least a merchant 
buyer, to give timely notice of the breach or he loses his remedies.28 
lt has long been in dispute under German law whether the commercial 
buyer who did not notify the seller of defects discoverable by a reasonable 
inspection thereby loses his action in tort law as well. In a landmark decision 
the German Supreme Court in 198729 took the position that the buyer's 
claim based in tort is not barred. The facts of the case are interesting enough 
tobe summarized here. The buyer, a winery, ordered corks of the lowest 
grade, generally used to cork bottles with inexpensive wines not tobe stored 
for long periods of time. The buyer, however, used them to cork bottles of 
"Spätlese," expensive wine made from late-gathered grapes, only to find out 
a few months later that the wine had been ruined w hich caused him a loss of 
about 300.0ÖO DM. Had the buyer inspected the corks -just by cutting one 
through - he easily could have found out that the corks were totally 
unsuitable for his intended purpose. Although all contractual remedies were 
barred, the Supreme Court allowed the buyer to recover at least part of his 
loss as property damage under tort law. 
In the U nited States as well the notice requirement in products liability has 
been restricted to cases based on warranty. 30 No such requirement is imposed 
where the plaintiff seeks recovery in negligence or - as the landmark case of 
26. K-Lines Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242,541 P. 2d 1378 (1975); Delta Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974); Keystone Aeronautics 
Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1974); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea 
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981). 
27. Art. 12. 
28. UCC Section 2-607; HGB Section 377. 
29. BGH 16 Sept. 1987, WM 1987, see also BGH 28 April 1976, BGHZ 66, 208; cf also 
Schlechtriem in II Festschrift Rheinstein, (1969) 683,695 et seq; SchwarkAcP 179 (1979) 
57, 76 et seq. 
30. See Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14, Section 2.35 at 234. 
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Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 31 already laid down in 1962 - in 
strict liability in tort. 
d) Statutes of Limitations 
The question of what statute of limitations is to be applied becomes of 
great practical importance. 
In West German law, contractual remedies for breach of warranty are 
barred six months after delivery of the goods, 32 whereas the statute of 
limitations for claims for property damages in tort law sets an outer limit of 
three years beginning with the moment the plaintiff has knowledge of the 
injury and the person of the defendant, 33 at the latest 30 years after the 
tortious conduct. The Supreme Court has never transferred the shorter 
contractual limitation period to concurring liability in tort. 34 
Although in the U nited States the relevant statutes of limitations do not 
differ as much concerning the periods they provide as under German law 
(under the UCC it is four years;35 state statutes of limitations in respect to 
property damages provide for periods between one and six years36), the 
differentiation becomes highly relevant when dealing with the time when the 
statute begins to run. 37 Contractual remedies are barred four years after 
delivery, whereas statutes oflimitations for tort actions begin to run with the 
time of injury or the time the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have 
discovered all the essential elements of his possible cause of action. 38 
31. Supra note 4. 
32. BGB Section 477. 
33. BGB Section 852. 
34. See, e.g., BGH 25 May 1976, BGHZ 66, 315 at 318; for a thorough discussion, see 
Schlechtriem, in II Gutachten und Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, 
(1981) 1591, 1661; contra, OLG Düsseldorf 14 Oct. 1974, NJW 1975, 453; but cf 
Schubert NJW 1975, 1230. 
35. UCC Section 2-725. 
36. For an overview of state statutes of limitations, see Appendix E to In re Agent Orange 
Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 at 879-898 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
37. See Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14, Section 9.15 at 1167 et seq. 
38. See Ohler v. Tacorna Gen. Hosp., 598 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1979). For further case law, see 
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts (1984 5th ed.) Ch. 5, Section 30 at 166 et seq. 
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e) Conventions on the International Sale of Goods 
Last but not least, the classification of a loss as property damage in the 
case of an international sale of goods may be decisive for the application of 
internationally unified sales law and/ or national tort law. 
lt is unanimously held that the Hague Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods does not exclude national tort law. 39 The 
Vienna Convention seems to embrace property damages - Article 5 
expressly excludes liability for personal injuries only from the sphere of 
application. However German authors favor the position that if there is 
property damage in the sense of Section 823 par. 1 BGB, the seller's liability 
is also governed by domestic tort law, 40 a result that might interfere with 
basic ideas of th_e Convention. 
Bearing these implications in mind I now want to discuss possible solutions 
for the groups of cases mentioned at the beginning. 
IV. Classification in Detail 
1. Damage to the Chatte/ Jtself 
Whether damage to the chattel itself may by recovered under tort theories 
is a highly controversial issue. 
In the Federal Republic until 1976 damage to the chattel itself was not 
regarded as property damage in the sense of Section 823 par. 1 BGB, since it 
was argued the buyer never was the owner of a chattel free from defects that 
could be damaged. In 1976, however, the Supreme Court changed its position 
allowing, for the first time, recovery in tort in the case of damage to the 
chattel itself attributable to a so-called "spreading defect. "41 
In further decisions,42 this holding has been affirmed. Initially unclear 
what criteria to apply to draw the line between purely economic loss and 
39. See, e.g., Dölle (-Herber), EKG (1976),.EKG Art. 8 No. 11. 
40. See Schlechtriem, Einheitliches UN-Kaufrecht (1981) at 21; but cf. Honnold, Uniform 
Law for International Safes under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982) at 102 et 
seq. 
41. BGH 24 Nov. 1976, BGHZ 67,359 = JZ 1977, 343; annotated by Lieb and Rengier, ibid. 
42. BGH 5 July 1978, NJW 1978, 2241; BGH 18 Jan. 1983, BGH 86, 256 = JZ 1983, 499 
annotated by Stall, ibid.; BGH 14 May 1985, NJW 1985, 2420; contra LG Karlsuhe 22 
Tnlv 1987 . .TZ 1987. 828. 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PROPERTY DAMAGES 135 
property damage, it is now considered essential whether the original 
depreciated value is identical with the loss suffered later or not. 43 That means 
whenever the defect was reparable, a tort action for damage to the chattel 
itself is possible. The nature of the defect, however, is not decisive. Thus in 
the latest case decided by the Supreme Court in 1985,44 the buyer of a 
compressor prevailed in a tort action, while warranty remedies were barred 
by the statute of limitations. The compressor had a defectively designed oil 
drain causing damage to the diesel engine, that had to be replaced. 
American courts, too, seem divided on the question of whether damage to 
the chattel itself is actionable in tort. 45 Those states allowing recovery of 
purely economic loss under tort theories46 consequently do not hesitate to 
hold the manufacturer liable in tort for damage to the chattel itself. On the 
other hand, there seems tobe a slight majority defining damage to the chattel 
itself as purely economic loss, 47 thus denying recovery at least under strict 
liability in tort - a position that has lately been taken by the U.S. Supreme 
Court48 under Maritime Law, t_oo. There are some cases, however, allowing 
recovery on a negligence theory.49 
A number of states take a middle course. Instead of focusing on the items 
for which recovery is sought, major importance is given t_o the nature of the 
defect and the type of risk it poses. One of the leading cases enunciating this 
principle - though this reasoning seemingly goes back as far as a case 
decided by the Appellate Division of the N.Y. Supreme Court in 191550 -is 
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.SI A front-end 
loader, purchased from the defendant and used by the plaintiff for four 
43. BGH 14 May 1985, supra note 42; contra Reinicke & Tiedtke, "Stoffgleichheit zwischen 
Mangel unwert und Schäden im Rahmen der Produzentenhaftung," in N JW 1986, 10, 13 
et seq. (non-practicability of this criterion). 
44. BGH 14 May 1985, supra note 42. 
45. See Note, "Tort Recovery for Self-Inflicted Damages," 84 Mich. L. Rev. 517 (1985); 
Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14, Sections 2.31-2.33 at 218"-228. 
46. See, e.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., supra note 8; Lang v. General Motors 
Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965). 
47. Fora citation of cases, see Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14, Section 2.22 at 186 et 
seq. 
48. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986). 
49. See Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14, Section 2.21 at 183 et seq; Prosser & Keeton, 
supra note 38, Ch. 7, Section 101 at 708 n. 3; see also Gaebler, "Negligence, Economic 
Loss, and the U.C.C .. " 61 Ind. L.J. 593 (1986) at 627 et seq. 
50. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1915) 
51. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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years, suddenly caught fire in the front portion near the hydraulic lines. The 
operator failed to shut off the motor upon leaving the machine. As a result, 
hydraulic fluid continued to fuel the fire and the machine was severely 
damaged. The plaintiff contended that the design of the loader was defective 
~ecause it omitted a fire suppression system, and that an additional defect 
was the lack of adequate warnings. The court regarded the alleged defect as 
constituting a safety hazard that posed a serious risk,.ofharm to people. Thus 
- it was argued - the complaint fell within the policy of tort law that the 
manufacturer should bear the risk of hazardous products. 52 
On the other hand, absent a "man-endangering" defect, courts generally 
define damage to the chattel itself as purely economic lass. An excellent 
example comparable to the compressor case of the German Supreme Court is 
Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc. 53 where a car's engine was irreparably 
damaged because the engine's heater core had ruptured permitting the 
coolant to escape and thus developing excessive heat. Recovery in tort was 
denied. 
The EEC Directive54 explicitly limits liability to "any item of property 
other than the product itself." Thus there seems to be a clear solution to the 
"damage to the chattel itself" situation. But a closer look reveals that the 
question may still arise in cases where an ite:in composed of several parts is 
damaged. "Product"in the sense of the Directive is defined as any "movable, 
even though incorporated into another movable. "55 Thus it may be argued in 
the heater core case that the "defective product" is the heater core only, an 
item easily distinguishable from other parts of the car, thus leaving the 
damage to the engine actionable as property damage under the Directive. 
The comment on the Draft of the West German Products Liability Statute, 
implementing the Directive, expressly leaves the line-drawing in these cases 
to the courts. 56 And German authors, coinmenting on the Directive, have 
already taken the view that the aforementioned interpretation should be 
possible57 especially if the distinguishable defective part has not been 
52. Jbid. at 1174-1175. 
53. 608 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. App. 1981). 
54. Art. 9 par. 1 lit b. 
55. EEC Directive Art. 2. 
56. See "Begründung zu dem Gesetz über die Haftung für fehlerhafte Produkte," in 
Arbeitsmaterialien zum deutschen Produkthaftungsgesetz, PHI Sonderdruck, July 1987 
at 106. 
57. See Schlechtriem, "Angleichung der Produktehaftung in der EG," VersR 1986, 1033, 
1041 et seq. 
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,roduced by the manufacturer of the whole product, but by a component 
,art manufacturer.ss So even under the EEC Directive there remains the 
ask of differentiating between property damage and economic loss, at least 
n case of a so-called spreading defect. 
I think the line has tobe drawn according to the basic aims of contract and 
,ort law, respectively. Contract law aims to secure that the buyer receives 
;vhat he bargained for. The contemplation rule as to secondary economic 
.oss, the possibility of disclaiming liability, notice requirements, and statutes 
)f limitation beginning to run on delivery - all these characteristics seek to 
balance the interests between seller and buyer according to the terms of the 
:;ontract. Tort law, in contrast, does not relate to the bargain; its most 
lmportant concern is accident reduction and safety, primarily safety for 
b.uman health. 
Damage to the chattel itself therefore, in my opinion, has tobe dealt with 
primarily by contractual remedies. Why should the buyer in the German 
compressor case59 be able to sue the seller for a minimum period of 30 years 
whereas if the whole compressor were irreparably defective and therefore 
just stopped after six months, his action would be barred by the statute of 
limitations concerning warranties. lt is hard to see any difference between 
the two cases; in either_ case the buyer has not received what he bargained for. 
However, there are strong arguments to allow recovery under tort theories 
if the damage to the chattel itself results from a man-endangering defect and 
is accompanied by personal injury or damage to other property, or these 
latter losses do not occur by pure chance only. Viewed from the objective of 
prevention of marketing unsafe products, it should not be decisive what item 
of property is damaged or destroyed, but rather what kind of a defect is 
imputed to the defendant. 
This solution corresponds to the aforementioned line of cases in American 
law.60 lt may also be achieved under the EEC Directive though, at least in 
cases where a discernable part of the chattel is unreasonably dangerous. 
Article 6 of the Directive, that defines a product as being defective if it does 
not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, may form the 
basis for the diff erentiation supported here. 
58. See Schmidt-Salzer, I Kommentar EG-Richtlinie Produkthaftung, (1986) Art. 9 No. 28. 
59. Supra note 42. 
60. Supra notes 50 and 51; see also G. Hager, "Einstandspflicht des Produzenten für das 
Äguivalenz- und Nutzungsinteresse des Produkterwerbers," BB 1987, 1748, 1750. 
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2. Damage to Property Intentionally Coming into Close Contact with the 
Product 
In the second group, the questiön arises whether damage to property 
deliberately coming into close contact with the product may be defined as 
property damage under tort law. 
The examples are numerous: contaminated sand is commingled with 
other materials belonging to the buyer, the defective oil drain is installed into 
the buyer's car; the defective sawmill spoils the lumber being processed. 
German courts dealing with these cases generally take a rather formalistic 
approach: whether there is actionable property damage_ is defined on the 
basis of property law. In the commingling cases, property damage is denied 
because the commingled materials form a new item of property, although 
defective as a whole. 6I lt is argued that the buyer, thus becoming owner of 
newly originating property, cannot be damaged in said property at the same 
time. 
In the other cases where, according to property law principles, the product 
and the earlier acquired property of the buyer do not form a new item of 
property a claim in tort usually is approved. 62 Rare are the cases where 
German courts favor a more functional than formalistic approach. 63 
With respect to processing machinery there are only afew German appeal 
cases. Whereas in the case of a defective sawmill one appellate court64 denied 
a property damage in respect to the lumber, another appellate court65 in a 
dictum involving dairy machinery answered the question in the affirmative, 
where the defect would cause the milk to be stirred into butter. 
Although there are a few American cases - especially when processing 
machinery is concerned66 - supporting a finding of property damage with 
similar arguments as those used by German courts, namely, that property 
61. See RG 27 April 1905, JW 1905, 367, No. 6. 
62. See BGH 4 March 1971, BGHZ 55, 392; BGH 24 March 1977, NJW 1977, 1819, 
annotated by Schlechtriem, ibid,: BGH 16 Sept. 1987, supra note 29. 
63. Cf BGH 25 May 1972, in Schmidt-Salzer, III Entscheidungssammlung Produkthaftung, 
at I. 159. 
64. OLG Hamm 12 July 1961, VersR 1962, 432. 
65. OLG Karlsruhe 30 May 1985, VersR 1986, 1125. 
66. Cf LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F. 2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981); Abco Metals 
Corp v. J. W. Imports Co., 560 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
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previously owned by the buyer is destroyed, 67 there seems to be a strong 
tendency to draw the line in this group according to the "damage to the 
chattel itself" situation. 68 
That means an action for property damage in tort does not depend on the 
intricacies of property law. lt rather depends on the nature of the defect and 
the manner in which the loss occurred. Thus recovery in tort has been denied 
where an assembler of turbines suffered physical damages to the turbine 
because parts supplied by a component part manufacturer did notconform 
to the contract drawing;69 where the defect of a computer caused the loss of 
stored data;70 where because of defective shingles the underlying roofing 
material was damaged;71 or where polluted flour contaminated other 
ingredients.72 Recovery in tort, however, was allowed where the defect of a 
product used in construction resulted in the cracking of masonry ol'.l the 
exterior of a building posing a real risk for persons going by;73 or where the 
malfunctioning of a manual controller of a gas turbine damaged the latter by 
fire and explosion. 74 
The EEC D1rective does not give any explicit guidance as to whether an 
action under the Directive will lie for the group of cases discussed here, 
leaving it to national law to make the appropriate distinctions. 
In many of the cases discussed here, the closely related property of the 
buyer is damaged because the product does not live up to the rightful 
expectations of the buyer according to the provisions of the contract. 
An excellent example is the already discussed cork case decided by the 
German Supreme Court in 1987.75 Suppose the buyer did not clarify his 
intended use for the corks, thus leaving the seller to believe that they would 
67. Queensbury Union v. Jim Walter Corp., 442N.Y.S. 2d 650(App. Div.1981); Manningv. 
International harvester Co., 381 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa App. 1985). 
68. See text supra at Section IV .1; see also Cartwright & Phillips, supra note 14, Section 2.29 
at 209 et seq. 
69. American Horne Assur. Co. v. Major Tool & Machine, Inc., 767 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1985). 
70. Antel Oldsmobile Cadillac Inc. v. Sirus Leasing Co., 475 N.Y.S. 2d 944 (App. Div. 1984). 
71. 2000 Watermark Ass'n, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986); Chicago 
Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of America, 782 F. 2d 723 (7th Cir. 1986); Jones & 
La.ughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Safes Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
72. Dixie-Portland Flour Mills v. Nation Enterprises, 613 F. Supp. 985 (D.C. I1l. 1985). 
73. Philadelphia National Bank v. Dow Chemical Co., 605 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Penn. 1985). 
7 4 Salt River Project Agricultural Jmprovement and Power District v. Westinghouse Electric 
(;orp., 694 P. 2d 198 (Ariz. 1984). 
75. Supra note 29. 
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be used as customary, namely for rather inexpensive wines. Should the seller 
be held liable in case of a defect for the much greater loss the buyer suffered 
when bottling "Spätlese''? Here the example given by Molinaeus76 as early as 
the sixteenth century is still valid: One who sells a leaking beer barrel is liable 
. for the value of lost beer but not for the higher value of wine that has been 
barreled unexpectedly. lt is here, too, where notice requirements and the 
possibility for the seller to disclaim his liability ate perfectly adequate. 
Again, however, cases where the defect causes a safety hazard, especially _ 
to human health, should .be distinguished. If in the cork case, the corks 
poison the wine and the buyer prevents personal injury of the consumer by 
not marketing or by recalling already mar:keted bottles, it is primarily the 
manufacturer ofthe corks who is, accordingto the generalgoals oftortlaw, 
to be held liable for the situation. Giving the buyer a remedy in tort for 
destruction of the wine at the same time serves these general purposes. 
3. Products Designed to Protect Property 
The third group comprises products exclusively designed to protect 
property. Does a tort action lie if the very damage to the property that the 
product is designed to prevent occurs? Cases coming to courts mostly 
concerned pesticides or herbicides and, in the U.S., alarm systems. 
In two landmark decisions in 1981 the German Supreme Court approved 
the buyer's claim in tort against the manufacturer of fungicides. 77 The fungus 
that the product was supposed to kill had become resistant, thus destroying 
the buyer's apple harvest. Liability in tort in these cases lies - as the 
Supreme Court put it - if the user could have prevented the damage by 
applying other measures of prot~ction and the manufacturer kept him from 
doing so, because he relied on the suitability of the product.78 The majority 
of American courts seem to follow another line. Thus a farmer who had 
purchased barns for the curing of to bacco was confined to repair and 
replacement under the contract, 79 and neither the buyer of an irrigation 
system who suffered a loss of 50 percent of his corn crop,so nor the buyer of 
76. See König in Kolloquium für von Caemmerer (1973) 75, 77. 
77. BGH 17 March 1981, BGHZ 80, 186; BGH 17 March 1981, BGHZ 80, 199. 
78. BGH 17 March 1981, BGHZ 80, 199. 
79. Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Products Co., 674 F. 2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982). 
80 T,nckwood Corv. v. Svencer, 613 S.W. 2d 369 (Tex. App. 1981). 
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defective animal feed that caused chickens at first to produce eggs that tasted 
badly and finally not to produce any eggs at all, 81 prevailed on the basis of 
strict liability in tort. 
The alarm system cases are treated similarly.s2 Where a burglar alarm 
system fails and the buyer loses his property by burglary, American courts 
generally agree that the buyer should be confined to contractual remedies, 
which also usually means upholding a clause in the contract that limits 
liability to a certain amount very much below the actual loss sustained. 
Again, the EEC Directive does not express any opinion on the question of 
whether the damages in this group can be regarded as property damage. One 
German authors3 has argued that in this group of cases under the Directive it 
is rather a question of causation than one of defining the term of property 
damage. I cannot agree with this interpretation. 
In respect to property protecting products, it is even more necessary to 
draw an accurate line between contract and tort law than in the 
aforementioned groups of cases. The suitability of a product is the typical 
contractual interest of a buyer. This may be shown by a simple comparison 
with late delivery. The buyer may sustain the very same damage if the seller 
does not deliver a defective product but if he is merely late in delivering it, 
only if the buyer relying on timely performance refrains from other protective 
measures. 
The qualities a product must have in order to protect certain property 
depends on the specific terms of the contract. Liability for damages resulting 
from nonsuitability typically should be open to negotiation between the 
parties. And it is here as well that a failure of inspection and notification 
should bar the buyer's remedies. 
Still, there might be cases in this group as well where a tort remedy will lie, 
namely, where the product is not just unsuitable for the intended purpose 
but poses a safety hazard, like where the property protected by a burglar 
alarm system is destroyed by a fire caused by a short circuit in the system. 
81. Brown v. Western Farmers' Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P. 2d 537 (1974). 
82. Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec., etc., 632 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. en banc 1982); 
Fireman 's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc. 417 
N.E. 2d 131 (Ill. App. 1980); Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 437 A. 2d 417 (Pa. 
Super. 1981); for further cases, see Annotation, 37 A.L.R. 4th (1985) 47 et seq. 
83. Schlechtriem, supra note 57 at 1034. 
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4. Actual Threat of Personal Jnjury or Property Damage as Equivalent to 
Property Damage 
lt is not until recently that the question has been put anew whether costs 
för repair and replacement may be claimed under tort law, at least if there is 
an actual threat of personal injury or property dam~ge. Whereas in the past 
these lasses were nearly unanimously regarded as constituting economic lass 
recoverable under contract law only, recent case law suggests a process of 
change. 
The German Supreme Court did not have to rule on the question recently. 
There is, however, a dictum by a German appellate court84 allowing the 
manufacturer of dairy machinery to recoup, in tort, the costs of repairs he 
performed when the machines were already delivered to his customers from 
the component part manufacturer of capacitors. Because of an alleged defect 
of the capacitor, damage to the milk being processed was allegedly 
threatening. 
In the U.S. the law seemed to be rather settled for a long time by the 
well-known decision of the New York Supreme Court in Trans World 
Airlines v. Curtiss- Wright, 85 denying tort recovery for the replacement costs 
of defective aircraft engines. Although there are many cases that still adhere 
to the position that before any accident occurs, repair and replacement costs 
have to be treated as purely economic loss, 86 numerous exceptions to this 
rule can be found in recent American case law. 
One important group where recovery on the basis of strict liability in tort 
has been allowed are the asbestos cases,87 where owners ofbuildings equipped 
with asbestos-containing materials claim damages from the manufacturers 
for removing said materials. Major importance in these cases is given to the 
fact that there is a continual serious risk of personal injury that can only be 
prevented by removing the materials. A result similar to that in the asbestos 
84. OLG Karlsruhe 30 May 1985, VersR 1986, 1125. 
85. 1 Misc.2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup.Ct. 1955). 
86. See Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D.Ga. 1981); 
Hilt Truck Line, Inc. v. Pullman, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 310 (Neb. 1986); Eaton Corp. v. 
Magnavox Co., 581 F.Supp. 1514 (D.C.Mich. 1984); National Crane Cdrp. v. Ohio Steel 
Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983). 
87. See County of Johnson, Tennessee v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1984); Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1207 (D.Col. 
1986); City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986). 
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cases was reached by the Alaska Supreme Court, 88 where the plaintiffs had 
to tear out the inner walls of their building because of ureaformaldehyde 
insulation that.had been used when constructing the building. 
Although in. these cases one still might have argued that other property 
had been contaminated and thus damaged, there is a line of further cases 
where damage to other property was certainly absent. In California, the 
holding in Seely v. White Motor Co. 89 serves as precedent disallowing 
recovery of purely economic loss under strict liability in tort; however the 
Court of Appeals in 1985 allowed a seafood company to recover for purely 
economic loss against a remote manufacturer of cans on the basis of a 
negligence action. 90 Although the court relied on the fact of a close connection 
between the plaintiff and the manufacturer in the case at bar - the reasoning 
of the California Supreme Court in the J'Aire case91 ~ much emphasis was 
laid on the nature of the defect as well. If the cans had been actually used to 
pack abalone as inte~ded and known to the can manufacturer, they would 
have been subject to acid corrosion andin turn would have proved hazardous 
to the health of the ultimate consumers of the abalone.92 Thus liability of the 
can manufacturer was seen to accomplish two societal objectives: first, to 
discourage manufacturers from putting dangerous products into the stream 
of commerce; and second, to encourage intermediate enterprises to detect 
and remove dangerous products from the market before they can cause 
harm to the ultimate consumer. This solution corresponds · to recent 
developments in the field ofliability of builders, designers and architects for 
defective construction of buildings. Where the defects of the building are 
dangerous, a negligence action against these persons will lie, even though 
there has not beeri any harm to other property.93 
The EEC Directive does not tackle this pro blem, thus leaving its solution 
to national tort law. 
The answer for this group of cases must again depend on the respective 
goals of contract and tort liability. In view of the general purpose of tort law 
88. Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983). 
89. Cf supra note 10. 
90. Ales-Peratis Foodsv. American Can Co., 164 Cal. App.3d 277,209 Cal.Rptr. 917 (1985). 
91. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979). 
92. 164 Cal.App.3d 277 at 289 et seq., 209 CaLRptr. 9liat924 et seq. 
93. Cf Huang v. Garner, 203 Cal.Rptr. 800 (Cal.App. 1984); Council of Co-Owners 
Atlantis Condominium Inc. v. Whiting Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 
336 (1986). 
144 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LA W 
to protect society's interest in freedom from harm through unanticipated 
injury,94 it seems but the last consequent step to focus exclusively on the 
nature of the defect - leaving aside the nature of damage sustained and the 
way in which it occurred, that is whether or not there was a sudden and 
calamitous event - and to allow recovery for repair and replacement if there 
exists an actual threat of personal injury. The reasoning of the Califomia 
Court of Appeals in this respect appears to be compelling. 
The famous argument that has often been advanced against recovery of 
economic loss under tort theories, namely that allowing recovery would 
open a floodgate ofliability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class,95 is not valid here: costs of repair and 
replacement, in contrast to lost profits for example, are of a limited and 
generally predictable amount and the number of possible plaintiffs is at least 
restricted by the number of marketed products. 
lt should be noted, however, that extending liability in tort to repair and 
replacement costs has to go hand in hand with defining property damage as 
such narrowly, as has been suggested for the previous groups of cases. 
Otherwise liability in tort might indeed be no more predictable. 
V. Conclusion 
The aforementioned observations lead to the conclusion that the nature of 
the damage sustained is and should be becoming of less importance as a 
guideline to distinguish contract and tort liability in products liability cases. 
Instead, primary emphasis should be laid on the type of defect of the prod uct 
in question. 
In American law, this step seems to be easier to take as one can rely upon 
the wording of Section 402A of Restatement of Torts (Second), that 
presupposes "a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer." However, similar results seem possible under the 
EEC Directive which defines a product as being defective when it does not 
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect. 96 
But also under German law a similar interpretation can be justified. 
94. See Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. (N.J.), supra note 11. 
95 See the opinion of Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Tauche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 
N.E. 441 (1931). 
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Verkehrspflichten of the product manufacturer, i.e. duties whose violation 
may be actionable in tort, may be well defined in the sense of Section 402A of 
Restatement of Torts (Second); namely the principal duty not to market any 
man-endangering product. 
There remains one pro blem to be mentioned: Does restricting liability in 
tort to cases where a product is dangerous to human health lead to an 
insupportable deficiency in the protection of property interests? 
Two alternatives have to be distinguished here: first the case of a 
contractual relationship between the manufacturer and the plaintiff; and 
second, the case where privity is lacking. 
In case of privity, the buyer undoubtedly is entitled to contractual 
remedies. The major problem posed in German law, however, is the six 
month statute of limitations in warranty actions. Circumventing this very 
short period has been one of the main reasons - although not verbally 
expressed - why courts tended to resort to tort remedies.97 But instead of 
extending tort law, the statute oflimitations should be and probably will be 
amended.98 
Where there is no privity, restricting tort liability seems to leave a 
protection gap at first glance, as the buyer can only sue his immediate seller, 
who might have gone out of business. But here, in my opinion, the 
appropriate path is to eliminate the requirement ofvertical privity in certain 
cases.99 The crucial point is that this liability for defective products remains 
contractual in nature except for the privity requirement, that is, it is governed 
by all the aforementioned characteristics of contract law, especially the 
possibility to disclaim or limit liability. 
97. Except for BGH 18 Jan. 1983, BGHZ 86, 256, all decisions allowing tort recovery for 
damage to the product itself involved an immediate seller-buyer relationship. 
98. See, e.g., Heinrichs, "Reform des Verjährungsrechts?" NJW 1982, 2021 at 2027. 
99. See White & Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
(1980 2d ed.) Section 11-3 at 401 et seq. Fora citation of states that have enacted their 
own expansive provisions, see ibid. at 404 note 20. 
